The Arizona Wildcats have a third-down problem. It’s one of many. But it’s among the most significant causes of the UA’s school-record 11-game losing streak.
The 2020 Cats are converting third downs at a historically low rate. Their current mark is 29.5%. It’s within striking distance of the Wildcats’ worst figure since they joined the Pac-10/12 in 1978.
The 2003 Cats, under John Mackovic and Mike Hankwitz, converted 26.5% of their third downs. Only two other times have they been under 30%: 2000 (28.1%) and 2004 (29.9%).
If you’re wondering whether third-down percentage correlates to winning percentage, the answer is an emphatic yes. The ’03 team had 10 losses, the most in UA annals. The current squad, which is 0-4, ranks last in the Pac-12 in third-down percentage and 121st in the nation. The six teams below Arizona — Bowling Green, Syracuse, Louisiana-Monroe, UMass, Kansas and Colorado State — have a combined record of 2-41.
Meanwhile, 15 teams have converted 50% or more. Only two (Minnesota and North Texas) have records below .500. The 15 have a combined mark of 91-20.
So what exactly is happening here with the Wildcats? Why are they so inept on third down?
That’s what we’re going to examine in this week’s Territorial Cup version of “Cats Stats.”
As is often the case, the numbers tell the tale. Arizona has had major problems protecting the quarterback. When the Wildcats get into third-and-long situations, their success rate drops precipitously.
For the purpose of this exercise, and to keep things simple, we’re defining “third-and-long” as any third-down situation that requires 6 or more yards. Arizona has faced 40 of those and has converted only nine for a success rate of 22.5%. Even if you take out two situations where the Wildcats weren’t trying to gain a first down because of field position and the clock, they’re still at 23.7%.
Meanwhile, when needing 5 or fewer yards, Arizona is 9 of 21 — 42.9%. Respectable.
It isn’t unusual for offenses to have a harder time converting in long-yardage situations; it’d be surprising if that weren’t the case. But that disparity is extreme. The average yardage needed in the two scenarios helps explain the gap.
Kevin Sumlin’s Wildcats are converting just 29.5% of their third downs, a historically bad number. The 2003 Cats, under John Mackovic and Mike Hankwitz, converted 26.5% of their third downs. Only two other times have they been under 30%: 2000 (28.1%) and 2004 (29.9%).
In the 21 third-and-5 situations the Wildcats have faced, the average distance they’ve needed to gain a first down is 2.9 yards. In the 40 times they’ve faced third-and-6 or longer, their average is 9.8 yards. That’s a tall task for any offense — but especially one that has yielded a conference-high 17 sacks.
Overall, the average distance Arizona has faced on third down is 7.4 yards, which falls squarely in the third-and-long category.
The Wildcats’ quarterback splits, via ESPN.com, mirror the offense’s third-down woes. Whether it’s Grant Gunnell or Will Plummer — who each have played two full games, aside from one play — the drop-off is severe.
Gunnell has been a highly efficient, accurate passer on first and second downs. He has completed 45 of 60 passes (75%) for 461 yards with five touchdowns and no interceptions.
On third down, it’s as if Gunnell is a different player. He’s 7 of 16 (43.8%) with one TD and one pick.
It’s a similar story for Plummer. On first and second downs, he’s 29 of 47 (61.7%) for 216 yards. On third down, he’s 7 of 18 (38.9%) for 86 yards.
Predictably, both quarterbacks’ completion percentages tumble even further when it’s third-and-6 or longer. Gunnell is at 36.4% (4 of 11); Plummer, 28.6% (4 of 14).
To say both have been under pressure on third down would be an understatement. The sack splits reveal just how much.
We don’t have the exact number of dropbacks for each quarterback, because play-by-play charts don’t differentiate between scrambles and designed QB runs. So, to make it an apples-to-apples comparison (or at least apples-to-pears), we’re going to eliminate those runs from the equation. (If you’re curious, Gunnell has three rushes on third down; Plummer has five.)
Will Plummer has been markedly better on first and second downs than third since taking over as Arizona’s starting quarterback two weeks ago.
Here’s how it breaks down for each quarterback and the team overall in terms of sack rate (sacks/pass attempts + sacks):
Gunnell
- First/second downs: 6.3% (4/64)
- Third down: 23.8% (5/21)
- Third-and-6+: 31.3% (5/16)
Plummer
- First/second downs: 4.1% (2/49)
- Third down: 21.7% (5/23)
- Third-and-6+: 17.6% (3/17)
Combined
- First/second downs: 5.3% (6/113)
- Third down: 22.7% (10/44)
- Third-and-6+: 24.2% (8/33)
Plummer has proved to have slightly better escapability, but there’s no avoiding the harsh reality here: An offense cannot function well with a sack rate of more than 20% on third down.
One final note: Arizona’s third-down struggles aren’t an entirely new-to-2020 development.
When the Wildcats were 4-1 last year, their third-down success rate was a robust 53.3% (41 of 77). Over the final seven games of 2019, the rate dropped to 37.6% (41 of 109).
Over the course of the losing streak, Arizona sits at 34.7%. The last time the Wildcats were below 40% for a season was 2016, when they went 3-9.
Final, final note: They defeated Arizona State to conclude that year and end an eight-game skid.
