Pac-12 Hotline mailbag: ACC-Big 12 merger(?), Pac-12 blame game, the Dartmouth case and more

Please note: Some questions have been edited for clarity and brevity.

To try and play defense with some offense in light of the Big Ten and SEC partnering up and gaining influence, should the ACC and Big 12 merge? — @Cargoman0363

In theory, sure. The conferences should explore all available routes to counteract the Big Ten and SEC as they consolidate power.

The Hotline felt that way about the Pac-12 and the Big 12 years ago and suggested a scheduling alliance that would have provided strength in numbers.

We wouldn't be surprised to hear the ACC and Big 12 have held informal discussions about ways they can work together and use scale to unlock value in non-conference matchups.

But an outright merger? In our view, it's impractical for a variety of reasons:

• Florida State, Clemson and North Carolina are loath to be locked into any new agreements unless those deals are with the Big Ten or SEC.
• An outright merger would assuredly require the ACC to rip up the grant-of-rights agreement that binds the schools together, thus creating an escape hatch for the Seminoles and others.
• How would it benefit Fox and ESPN? True, the networks have been working together recently — the announcement of a joint streaming platform (with Warner Bros. Discovery) is hard evidence of a thaw.

But they already have cut-rate deals: ESPN and Fox have a combined agreement with the Big 12 into 2031, while ESPN is all-in with the ACC until 2036.

The conferences would only agree to merge if it meant more revenue. Why would ESPN and Fox agree to pay more? If anything, the trajectory of media rights suggests consolidation, not expansion.

As the cable bundle shrinks, dollars become sparse. At the same time, the value of premier college football matchups continues to rise. ESPN and Fox have shown a willingness to pay billions for big brands in the SEC and Big Ten. They aren't going to pay one cent more to acquire the long-haul rights to Texas Tech vs. Virginia Tech, or UCF vs. Boston College.

If Big 12 commissioner Brett Yormark and ACC commissioner Jim Phillips can find common ground on scheduling partnerships for football or men's basketball, there might be an incremental revenue lift.

But we are skeptical of any scenario in which an outright merger would create more value for the conferences. In fact, it would devastate the ACC by providing its top brands with an exit route.

Fans of the Pac-12’s departing schools — or the Traitorous-10 — claim there was no linear TV element in the Apple deal presented just before the implosion. Has this been confirmed, or is it just face saving? — @YossarianSolo

They are correct. The final offer from Apple was an all-streaming deal for $25 million guaranteed (per school) and revenue escalators starting in Year 3 that would have been well within reach.

That said, the Pac-12 could have taken slightly less in guaranteed cash ($23 million) in exchange for Apple and the conference sub-licensing games on linear networks -- an arrangement comparable to Apple's deal with Major League Soccer.

Could you argue that partnering with the world's most influential and creative company was the right move for the long haul, especially given the likelihood that Apple will increase its presence in the sports media space? Absolutely. (And the Hotline did exactly that prior to the Pac-12's collapse.)

But you could also make the case that the schools needed more guaranteed revenue and access to linear TV (primarily through ESPN and Fox) to remain competitive.

One aspect of the proposal is beyond dispute:

George Kliavkoff completely misread the room in assuming his presidents and athletic directors would embrace a media deal rooted in revenue projections and subscription goals given the deep, lasting scars from the Pac-12 Networks' failed business model.

It was just another example of the disconnect between Kliavkoff and his campuses.

What will be the implications for college sports of Dartmouth athletes being told they are employees, especially with all of the other lawsuits the NCAA is facing? — @crashlit

We can't help but notice the conference closest to the NCAA ideal of amateurism, the Ivy League, is playing such an impactful role in forcing the association to abandon its model.

The National Labor Relations Board's decision earlier this week clears a path "for an election that would create the first labor union for NCAA athletes," according to the Associated Press report.

While significant as a standalone development, the move should be viewed in combination with another NLRB case: The complaint against USC, the Pac-12 and the NCAA, filed last spring, that attempts to define athletes as employees.

The USC complaint is potentially more damaging to the college amateurism model because of the joint nature of the filing. To this point, the NLRB's jurisdiction has been limited to private employers, as we saw with Northwestern's unionization efforts years ago. By combining the Pac-12 and NCAA, which have public schools under their purview, the board is attempting to have athletes at both private and public schools declared employees.

Our suggestion: Both cases are important, and if they don't succeed, there will be future NLRB filings elsewhere.

My sense is that all the players entering the transfer portal on the 30-day window (e.g. Washington, Arizona, Alabama) are doing so largely to test the market financially and leverage the current or future schools. Call me cynical, but it sounds more financial than about an institutional or coach fit. Am I wrong? — Alex F

That's precisely the reason behind most, although not all, transfer decisions.

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The players are lured into the portal by cash offers from other schools — offers that may or may not be legitimate.

And it's about to get more chaotic. An ongoing legal challenge to the NCAA's transfer policy is expected to result in immediate eligibility for multi-time transfers. (The Department of Justice has joined the suit, by the way.)

So if a quarterback — let's call him Matthew Denix Jr. — plays one year for Team X, then transfers to Team Y and plays immediately, he would need to sit out a year if he transfers to Team Z (unless he's a graduate student).

But if the plaintiffs are successful, then Denix could transfer to Team Z and play immediately as an undergraduate.

It's free agency 2.0, and it will have a 100-fold impact on roster construction.

I really liked the conversation on your podcast about judging coaches more by how they leave a school than how they arrive. Great perspective. — @gohuskies1978

Appreciate that.

Two components are worthy of additional mention:

• It's more difficult for fans to accept the change when a coach leaves for another job, as was the case last month with Washington's Kalen DeBoer and Arizona's Jedd Fisch. Retirements and terminations are easier on the psyche.
• Everything about the process, for all schools regardless of the specific circumstances, is more difficult because of the transfer portal and NIL. The moment the head coach departs, it's open season on the roster.

And because most of the players (understandably) prioritize the financial piece, they are vulnerable to being lured away from what appear to be favorable situations.

Rank who is more to blame for the demise of the Pac-12 out of these schools: Stanford, USC and Washington. — @jrg6887

The Hotline's official position is that no single school should be blamed for the demise of the conference. Years of poor leadership created the circumstances for collapse. Responsibility lies with the presidents and commissioners in charge since the early 2010s, not a particular school.

Also, we published a summary of culpability in October (in Murder on the Orient Express style) that details how each of the 10 departing universities played a role in the Pac-12's demise.

Of the three you mentioned, USC's actions had the greatest impact — and it's not close. Had the Trojans stayed in the conference through the negotiating window for media rights, the Pac-12 would have remained intact.

The same could be said, to a lesser degree, of UW: Had the Huskies accepted the all-in deal with Apple presented by Kliavkoff in early August, a grant-of-rights agreement would have been signed by the nine schools still committed at that point. But UW found the Apple proposal suboptimal.

Why was it suboptimal? Because the Pac-12 had lost the L.A. media market when USC and UCLA departed the previous summer.

Why did they leave? Because of years of mismanagement by the presidents and commissioners.

So if Florida State, Clemson, North Carolina and Virginia leave the ACC in the next one or two years, does that open an avenue for Cal and Stanford to return to the Pac-12? — Mike Arao

The ACC is on fragile ground, and Stanford and Cal committed to that shaky terrain for 12 years — most of them with significantly less media rights revenue than their peers. (In other words: They took a gigantic risk.)

We see one of four scenarios playing out:

1. The ACC remains intact for the duration of its contract cycle with ESPN (through 2036), which would be optimal for the Bay Area tandem.

2. With Florida State's lawsuit as the spark, the top football schools depart the ACC in a few years and leave behind a greatly depleted league that generates negligible media revenue and includes the Bay Area schools.

3. The departure of the ACC's top football schools leads to the complete dissolution of the conference, freeing Stanford and Cal from their contractual commitment -- and allowing them to rejoin the Pac-12.

4. College football undergoes a radical transformation in which all the power conferences dissolve and a super league, or separate subdivision, is formed.

The worst outcome for the Bay Area schools? No. 2.

That's not necessarily the most likely endgame — it's anyone's guess as to how this whole thing might play out. But it's the worst scenario for the two schools, by far.